China Plays Mediator to Libya’s Fighting Factions
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A Libyan rebel fighter uses a walkie talkie at their position in Misrata's western front line, some 25 km (16 miles) from the city center June 9, 2011
Libyan opposition forces trying to oust Moammar Gadhafi from his four decades in power are heading to China to seek support. Foreign Ministry official Chen Xiaodong announced the visit at a briefing Thursday – just as an envoy from Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi wrapped up a two-day visit during which he urged China to help secure a ceasefire. China also says Libya’s future should be freely determined by its own people.
The envoy from the Libyan leader traveled to China, earlier this week, seeking help in securing a ceasefire between his battered government and the rebels. On Thursday, Chinese Foreign Ministry official Chen Xiaodong revealed a delegation from the Libyan opposition would also soon be in Beijing to seek Chinese backing.
Chen said Beijing is “ready to receive” the Libyan rebels in the near future – though he did not specify a date.
Chinese diplomats and rebel leaders met recently in Qatar and in the rebel’s main base in the Libyan city of Benghazi.
Analysts speculate China is seeking a larger role as peacemaker because it secures much of its oil from the region.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said at regular media briefing Thursday China hopes the Libyan factions involved in armed conflict immediately begin a ceasefire to prevent further humanitarian disaster.
Hong says political means such as discussion and dialogue should be used to end the crisis.
He says Beijing wants to see relevant parties in Libya quickly resolve the crisis through political means.
Hong also re-asserted China’s opposition to military actions that exceed a U.N. Security Council resolution authorization. Chinese authorities have said that NATO air strikes on government positions in Libya go beyond the U.N. mandate.
During his two-day visit to Beijing, Gadhafi’s envoy Abdelati Obeidi said his government is ready to agree to a total ceasefire and hoped China will help broker such a temporary peace settlement.
Chen Xiaodong, who Chinese state media identified as director general of the Foreign Ministry’s West Asian and North African Affairs Department, was quoted as saying China has stepped up its push to persuade the two sides in the conflict to seek “an amicable settlement through dialogue”.
He also said China is mulling additional humanitarian aid for Libya.
EU draft U.N. resolution on Syria could hurt stability: China
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/31/us-china-syria-idUSTRE74U22E20110531
(Reuters) – China warned on Tuesday that a European draft resolution asking the U.N. Security Council to condemn Syria would not defuse tension in the region, suggesting Beijing could block it if it is submitted for a vote.
Britain, France, Germany and Portugal circulated the draft resolution, which is supported by the United States, to the 15-nation council last week.
Veto powers Russia and China and four other non-permanent members have voiced concern about the draft, which rebukes Syria for its bloody crackdown against anti-government protesters.
“The stability of Syria has a bearing on the stability of the whole region,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told a regular news briefing.
“The Chinese government supports Syria’s efforts to protect its sovereignty and stability and we hope that stability and order in Syria will be restored as soon as possible,” she added.
“In the current circumstances, we believe that the adoption of the U.N. Security Council resolution would do no good for the easing of tensions and stability in Syria.”
China has said that the outside world should not interfere in Syria’s internal affairs.
Apart from criticizing the Western air campaign against the forces of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s government, China has kept a relatively low profile in the tumult across the Middle East and north Africa.
Analysts have said that China will carefully foster ties and trade with new governments across the region, while being sure to present itself as a steadfast friend, and oil customer, of governments that ride out the unrest
Ten reasons why the China doubters are so very wrong
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http://gulfnews.com/business/opinion/ten-reasons-why-the-china-doubters-are-so-very-wrong-1.814524
Image Credit: Illustration: Nino Jose Heredia/©Gulf News
The China doubters are back in force. They seem to come in waves — every few years or so. Yet, year in and year out, China has defied the naysayers and stayed the course, perpetuating the most spectacular development miracle of modern times. That seems likely to continue.
Today’s feverish hand-wringing reflects a confluence of worries — especially concerns about inflation, excess investment, soaring wages, and bad bank loans. Prominent academics warn that China could fall victim to the dreaded “middle-income trap,” which has derailed many a developing nation.
There is a kernel of truth to many of the concerns cited above, especially with respect to the current inflation problem. But they stem largely from misplaced generalisations. Here are ten reasons why it doesn’t pay to diagnose the Chinese economy by drawing inferences from the experiences of others:
Strategy: Since 1953, China has framed its macro objectives in the context of five-year plans, with clearly defined targets and policy initiatives designed to hit those targets. The recently enacted 12th Five-Year Plan could well be a strategic turning point ushering in a shift from the highly successful producer model of the past 30 years to a flourishing consumer society.
Commitment: Seared by memories of turmoil, reinforced by the Cultural Revolution of the 1970s, China’s leadership places the highest priority on stability. Such a commitment served China extremely well in avoiding collateral damage from the crisis of 2008-2009. It stands to play an equally important role in driving the fight against inflation, asset bubbles, and deteriorating loan quality.
Wherewithal to deliver: China’s commitment to stability has teeth. More than 30 years of reform have unlocked its economic dynamism. Enterprise and financial-market reforms have been key, and many more reforms are coming. Moreover, China has shown itself to be a good learner from past crises, and shifts course when necessary.
China to step up fight against plastic addiction
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China will expand a ban on free shopping bags, state media said
China will expand a ban on free shopping bags, state media said, as it tries to further curb its addiction to plastic in a bid to rid the country of “white pollution” that clogs waterways, farms and fields.
Bookstores and pharmacies nationwide will soon be forbidden to give out free plastic bags, joining the ranks of supermarkets that have had to charge for shopping bags since June 1, 2008, the official Xinhua news agency reported.
On that day, China also banned the production, sale and use of ultra-thin plastic bags, becoming one of only a few nations around the world to take such tough measures.
Quoting Zhao Jiarong, deputy secretary general of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planner, the report said the government would also step up its crackdown on the illegal use of plastic bags.
But she did not say when bookstores and pharmacies would have to start charging for the bags they give out.
Power crisis may force China to face inflation demons
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/us-china-power-idUSTRE74Q0T520110527
A truck carrying a man drives past electricity wires near a coal-fired power plant, in Beijing May 24, 2011. Reuters Image
(Reuters) – Confronting a huge and growing power crisis, China faces a painful choice: either allow a summer of blackouts or swallow a dose of inflation.
The shortage, which has brought electricity cuts for big power consumers and a spate of emergency measures, was avoidable and foreseen by many economists and analysts.
It is not that China lacks the generation capacity to meet demand. Instead, analysts point to a lopsided electricity sector in which government controls starve producers of price rises so that manufacturers can guzzle cheap power.
That has created the worst power shortage in seven years as producers restrict output to make ends meet. The shortage is set to worsen as electricity demand rises during the peak summer months just as hydropower capacity has been hit by drought.
“This is going to be a big one, and it’s compounded by the fact that power companies are losing money for producing,” said Credit Suisse economist Dong Tao. “It is going to be a pretty sticky situation for growth and it will also add to inflationary pressure.”
The only real solution is for the government to raise prices, giving producers an incentive to increase power output, and then to tighten the monetary reins to prevent inflation from seeping into the economy.
The power deficit could exceed 30-40 gigawatts during the summer peak season, the State Grid Corporation of China says.
To put that in perspective, even if all the power plants in Argentina were plugged into China, it would not be quite enough to cover the shortage.
The drought has left water in some of the country’s biggest hydropower producing regions at critical levels just when output should be peaking. During May to October last year, hydropower generated a fifth of China’s electricity generation.
Some economists think the power shortages will be serious enough to slow China’s booming economic growth, which topped 10 percent last year.
Others see no impact, with an expected slowdown in the economy in the second half of the year easing the imbalance between supply and demand.
“The power shortage will cut industrial output (growth) in the second quarter by 0.5 percentage point, and cut GDP growth by 0.2 percentage point,” said Gao Shanwen, chief economist at China Essence Securities in Beijing.
Industrial Securities, a brokerage, said the drag on full-year economic growth could be twice as big at 0.4 percentage point should a 30 GW deficit last from June to August.
China refuses to commit itself to backing India’s case for NSG seat
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BEIJING: China on Thursday refused to commit itself to supporting India’s application for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the premier non-proliferation body. It preferred to hide behind procedural issues instead of taking a clear stand on the Indian move.
The new membership of the NSG should follow its “standard procedures based on consultations among its members,” Jiang Yu, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman said replying to a question on Beijing’s opinion about India’s application for NSG membership.
China’s response to the issue is important because the Indian application is expected to come up for discussion at NSG Plenary meeting to be held early next month.
New Delhi has managed to obtain the support of US, France and Russia and several other important member states of the NSG. But it still needs backing from China because it can influence the decision of several NSG members.
China had earlier expressed unhappiness over the India-US nuclear accord. It had raised some questions but later dropped its objection to an NSG waiver to enable India to carry out nuclear commerce in September 2008.
Rare earths dispute
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China has further tightened its grip on the rare earths market, raising taxes on the minerals. AFP Photo
BEIJING — China has further tightened its grip on the rare earths market, raising taxes on the minerals vital to high-tech industry and banning new projects to produce the metals via separation.
The State Council, China’s cabinet, also said late Thursday that it would prohibit any increase in production capacity for existing projects to separate rare earths from crude ores.
The commerce ministry had said earlier that it would expand export quotas for rare earths to include iron alloys containing more than 10 percent of the elements from Friday.
The coordinated announcements bolstered a campaign by Beijing to strengthen control over the highly sought-after metals — 17 elements critical to manufacturing everything from iPods to electric cars and missiles.
The State Council said the new policies would “promote the sustainable and healthy development of the rare earth sector”, which has become increasingly important given Beijing’s near-monopoly on production.
The government will “significantly reduce” the number of rare earth mining and separating enterprises via merger and acquisition — an effort that is seemingly aimed at strengthening the pricing power of producers, it said.
The State Council also said it would further raise the threshold for companies applying for export quotas and “severely punish” firms that resell the increasingly valuable quotas.
China produces more than 95 percent of the world’s rare earths and Beijing has started cleaning up the industry by closing illegal mines, setting tougher environmental standards and restricting exports.
The government has cut rare earth exports for the first half of 2011 by 35 percent compared to a year earlier, having slashed the quota by 72 percent for the second half of last year.
In April, it also raised the tax on rare earth ores to 30-60 yuan ($4.6-9.2) per tonne from the previous 0.4-3.0 yuan per tonne.
The moves have prompted complaints from foreign high-tech producers as the prices of rare earth metals surged on average by about 130 percent last year.
The United States and Australia have responded by developing or reopening mines shuttered when cheaper Chinese supplies became available.
In December a Japanese trading house announced it would build a plant for processing rare earth minerals in India in a bid to bypass China’s stranglehold on the market with an annual 4,000-ton production target.
Death toll at Foxconn China factory rises to three
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A worker inspects motherboards at the Foxconn's Shenzen factory in 2010.
(AFP)-The death toll from a blast at a Foxconn factory in China, reportedly in a building where Apple’s iPad 2 was being made, rose to three Sunday after a seriously injured worker died, state media said.
Two workers were initially killed and 16 injured in the explosion on Friday evening at the plant of a Foxconn subsidiary in Chengdu, capital of southwest China’s Sichuan province, according to the official Xinhua news agency.
An initial investigation indicated that the explosion could have been caused by combustible dust in the polishing workshop, it said, adding that investigators had ruled out the possibility of sabotage.
Operations in the workshop and other plant sections with similar processes had been suspended for further investigation and safety checks, Xinhua quoted a spokesman for Hongfujin Precision Electronics (Chengdu) Co. Ltd. as saying.
Hongfujin is a subsidiary of Taiwanese tech giant Foxconn, the world’s largest maker of computer components which produces items for Apple, Sony and Nokia.
The China Challenge
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703864204576315223305697158.html
By Henry Kissinger
Societies and nations tend to think of themselves as eternal. They also cherish a tale of their origin. A special feature of Chinese civilization is that it seems to have no beginning. It appears in history less as a conventional nation-state than as a permanent natural phenomenon. In the tale of the Yellow Emperor, revered by many Chinese as the legendary founding ruler, China seems already to exist.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, special assistant to President Nixon is toasted by Chinese Premier Chou En-laii Monday night, February 21, 1972 as the Nixon party was quest at a state dinner in Peking.
The Yellow Emperor has gone down in history as a founding hero; yet in the founding myth, he is re-establishing, not creating, an empire. China predated him; it strides into the historical consciousness as an established state requiring only restoration, not creation.
In general, Chinese statesmanship exhibits a tendency to view the entire strategic landscape as part of a single whole: good and evil, near and far, strength and weakness, past and future all interrelated. In contrast to the Western approach of treating history as a process of modernity achieving a series of absolute victories over evil and backwardness, the traditional Chinese view of history emphasized a cyclical process of decay and rectification, in which nature and the world could be understood but not completely mastered.
For China’s classical sages, the world could never be conquered; wise rulers could hope only to harmonize with its trends. There was no New World to populate, no redemption awaiting mankind on distant shores. The promised land was China, and the Chinese were already there. The blessings of the Middle Kingdom’s culture might theoretically be extended, by China’s superior example, to the foreigners on the empire’s periphery. But there was no glory to be found in venturing across the seas to convert “heathens” to Chinese ways; the customs of the Celestial Dynasty were plainly beyond the attainment of the far barbarians.
Chinese President Hu Jintao stands next to Mr. Kissinger at a luncheon on Jan. 10, 2011.
The most dramatic event of the Nixon presidency occurred in near obscurity. Nixon had decided that for a diplomatic mission to Beijing to succeed, it would have to take place in secrecy. A public mission would have set off a complicated internal clearance project within the U.S. government and insistent demands for consultations from around the world, including Taiwan (still recognized as the government of China). This would have mortgaged our prospects with Beijing, whose attitudes we were being sent to discover. Transparency is an essential objective, but historic opportunities for building a more peaceful international order have imperatives as well.
So my team set off to Beijing via Saigon, Bangkok, New Delhi and Rawalpindi on an announced fact-finding journey on behalf of the president. My party included a broader set of American officials, as well as a core group destined for Beijing—myself, as national security adviser, three aides and two Secret Service agents. The dramatic denouement required us to go through tiring stops at each city designed to be so boringly matter-of-fact that the media would stop tracking our movements. In Rawalpindi, we disappeared for 48 hours for an ostensible rest (I had feigned illness) in a Pakistani hill station in the foothills of the Himalayas—but our real destination was Beijing. In Washington, only the president and Col. (later Gen.) Alexander Haig, my top aide, knew our actual mission.
When the American delegation arrived in Beijing on July 9, 1971, we had experienced the subtlety of Chinese communication but not the way Beijing conducted actual negotiations, still less the Chinese style of receiving visitors. American experience with Communist diplomacy was based on contacts with Soviet leaders, principally Andrei Gromyko, who had a tendency to turn diplomacy into a test of bureaucratic will; he was impeccably correct in negotiation but implacable on substance—sometimes, one sensed, straining his self-discipline.
Strain was nowhere apparent in the Chinese reception of the secret visit or during the dialogue that followed. In all the preliminary maneuvers, we had been sometimes puzzled by the erratic pauses between their messages, which we assumed had something to do with the Cultural Revolution. Nothing now seemed to disturb the serene aplomb of our hosts, who acted as if welcoming the special emissary of the American president for the first time in the history of the People’s Republic of China was the most natural occurrence.
After being welcomed by the vice chairman of the military commission in Beijing, we soon discovered that our Chinese hosts had designed an almost improbably leisurely schedule—as if to signal that after surviving more than two decades of isolation, they were in no particular hurry to conclude a substantive agreement now. If one allowed for 16 hours for two nights’ rest, there would be less than 24 hours left for the first dialogue between countries that had been at war, near war, and without significant diplomatic contact for 20 years. In fact only two formal negotiating sessions were available: seven hours on the day of my arrival, from 4:30 p.m. to 11:20 p.m.; and six hours on the next, from noon until about 6:30 p.m.
It could be argued that the apparent Chinese nonchalance was a form of psychological pressure. To be sure, had we left without progress, it would have been a major embarrassment to Nixon. But if the calculations of two years of China diplomacy were correct, the exigencies that had induced Mao Zedong to extend the invitation might turn unmanageable by a rebuff of an American mission to Beijing.
Confrontation made no sense for either side; that is why we were in Beijing. Nixon was eager to raise American sights beyond Vietnam. Mao’s decision had been for a move that might force the Soviets to hesitate before taking on China militarily. Neither side could afford failure. Each side knew the stakes.
In a rare symbiosis of analyses, both sides decided to spend most of the time on trying to explore each other’s perception of the international order. Since the ultimate purpose of the visit was to start the process of determining whether the previously antagonistic foreign policies of the two countries could be aligned, a conceptual discussion—at some points sounding more like a conversation between two professors of international relations than a working diplomatic dialogue—was, in fact, the ultimate form of practical diplomacy.
When Premier Zhou Enlai arrived later that day, our handshake was a symbolic gesture—at least until Nixon could arrive in China for a public repetition—since Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had refused to shake hands with Zhou at the Geneva Conference in 1954, a slight that rankled, despite the frequent Chinese protestations that it made no difference. We then repaired to a conference room in the guesthouse and faced each other across a green baize table. Here the American delegation had its first personal experience with the singular figure who had worked by Mao’s side through nearly a half-century of revolution, war, upheaval and diplomatic maneuver.
Seven months later, on Feb. 21, 1972, President Nixon arrived in Beijing on a raw winter day. It was a triumphant moment for the president, the inveterate anti-Communist who had seen a geopolitical opportunity and seized it boldly.
As a symbol of the fortitude with which he had navigated to this day and of the new era he was inaugurating, he wanted to descend alone from Air Force One to meet Zhou, who was standing on the windy tarmac in his immaculate Mao jacket as a Chinese military band played “The Star-Spangled Banner.” The symbolic handshake that erased Dulles’s snub duly took place. But for a historic occasion, it was strangely muted. When Nixon’s motorcade drove into Beijing, the streets had been cleared of onlookers. And his arrival was played as the last item on the evening news.
As revolutionary as the opening itself had been, the final communiqué had not yet been fully agreed upon—especially in the key paragraph on Taiwan. A public celebration would have been premature and perhaps weakened the Chinese negotiating position of studied equanimity.
Our hosts made up for the missing demonstrations by inviting Nixon to a meeting with Mao within hours of our arrival. “Inviting” is not the precise word for how meetings with Mao occurred. Appointments were never scheduled; they came about as if events of nature. They were echoes of emperors granting audiences.
The first indication of Mao’s invitation to Nixon occurred when, shortly after our arrival, I received word that Zhou needed to see me in a reception room. He informed me that “Chairman Mao would like to see the President.” To avoid the impression that Nixon was being summoned, I raised some technical issues about the order of events at the evening banquet. Uncharacteristically impatient, Zhou responded: “Since the Chairman is inviting him, he wants to see him fairly soon.” In welcoming Nixon at the very outset of his visit, Mao was signaling his authoritative endorsement to domestic and international audiences before talks had even begun. Accompanied by Zhou, we set off for Mao’s residence in Chinese cars.
Mao’s residence was approached through a wide gate on the east–west axis carved from where the ancient city walls stood before the Communist revolution. Inside the Imperial City, the road hugged a lake, on the other side of which stood a series of residences for high officials. All had been built in the days of Sino-Soviet friendship and reflected the heavy Stalinist style of the period. Mao’s residence appeared no different, though it stood slightly apart from the others. There were no visible guards or other appurtenances of power. A small anteroom was almost completely dominated by a Ping-Pong table.
It did not matter because we were taken directly to Mao’s study, a room of modest size with bookshelves lining three walls filled with manuscripts in a state of considerable disarray. Books covered the tables and were piled up on the floor. A simple wooden bed stood in a corner. The all-powerful ruler of the world’s most populous nation wished to be perceived as a philosopher-king who had no need to buttress his authority with traditional symbols of majesty.
Mao rose from an armchair in the middle of a semicircle of armchairs with an attendant close by to steady him if necessary. We learned later that he had suffered a debilitating series of heart and lung ailments in the weeks before and that he had difficulty moving. Overcoming his handicaps, Mao exuded an extraordinary willpower and determination. He took Nixon’s hands in both of his and showered his most benevolent smile on him. The picture appeared in all the Chinese newspapers.
Nixon’s visit to China is one of the few occasions where a state visit brought about a seminal change in international affairs. The re-entry of China into the global diplomatic game, and the increased strategic options for the U.S., gave a new vitality and flexibility to the international system. Nixon’s visit was followed by comparable visits by the leaders of other Western democracies and Japan. Consultation between China and the United States reached a level of intensity rare even among formal allies.
Would the interests of the two sides ever be truly congruent? Could they ever separate them from prevalent ideologies sufficiently to avoid tumults of conflicting emotions? Nixon’s visit to China had opened the door to dealing with these challenges; they are with us still.
In recent years, China’s encounter with the modern, Western-designed international system has evoked in the Chinese elites a special tendency in which they debate—with exceptional thoroughness and analytical ability—their national destiny and overarching strategy for achieving it.
The world is witnessing, in effect, a new stage in a national dialogue about the nature of Chinese power, influence and aspirations that has gone on fitfully since the West first pried open China’s doors.
The previous stages of the national-destiny debate asked whether China should reach outward for knowledge to rectify its weakness or turn inward, away from an impure if technologically stronger world. The current stage of the debate is based on the recognition that the great project of self-strengthening has succeeded and China is catching up with the West. It seeks to define the terms on which China should interact with a world that—in the view of even many of China’s contemporary liberal internationalists—gravely wronged China and from whose depredations China is now recovering.
An example of the “triumphalist” line of thinking is in Col. Liu Mingfu’s 2010 book “China Dream.” In Liu’s view, no matter how much China commits itself to a “peaceful rise,” conflict is inherent in U.S.-China relations. The relationship between China and the U.S. will be a “marathon contest” and the “duel of the century.” Moreover, the competition is essentially zero-sum; the only alternative to total success is humiliating failure.
Neither the more triumphalist Chinese analyses nor the American version—that a successful Chinese “rise” is incompatible with America’s position in the Pacific, and the world—have been endorsed by either government, but they provide a subtext of much current thought. If the assumptions of these views were applied by either side—and it would take only one side to make it unavoidable—China and the U.S. could easily fall into an escalating tension.
China would try to push American power as far away from its borders as it could, circumscribe the scope of American naval power, and reduce America’s weight in international diplomacy. The U.S. would try to organize China’s many neighbors into a counterweight to Chinese dominance. Both sides would emphasize their ideological differences. The interaction would be even more complicated because the notions of deterrence and preemption are not symmetrical between these two sides. The U.S. is more focused on overwhelming military power, China on decisive psychological impact. Sooner or later, one side or the other would miscalculate.
The question ultimately comes down to what the U.S. and China can realistically ask of each other. An explicit American project to organize Asia on the basis of containing China or creating a bloc of democratic states for an ideological crusade is unlikely to succeed—in part because China is an indispensable trading partner for most of its neighbors. By the same token, a Chinese attempt to exclude America from Asian economic and security affairs will similarly meet serious resistance from almost all other Asian states, which fear the consequences of a region dominated by a single power.
The appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than “co-evolution.” It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides seek to identify and develop complementary interests.
The issue of human rights will find its place in the total range of interaction. The U.S. cannot be true to itself without affirming its commitment to basic principles of human dignity and popular participation in government. Given the nature of modern technology, these principles will not be confined by national borders. But experience has shown that to seek to impose them by confrontation is likely to be self-defeating—especially in a country with such a historical vision of itself as China. A succession of American administrations, including the first two years of President Barack Obama’s, has substantially balanced long-term moral convictions with case-to-case adaptations to requirements of national security. The basic approach remains valid; how to achieve the necessary balance is the challenge for each new generation of leaders on both sides.
When China and the U.S. first restored relations 40 years ago, the most significant contribution of the leaders of the time was their willingness to raise their sights beyond the immediate issues of the day. In a way, they were fortunate in that their long isolation from each other meant that there were no short-term day-to-day issues between them. This enabled the leaders of a generation ago to deal with their future, not their immediate pressures, and to lay the basis for a world unimaginable then but unachievable without Sino-American cooperation.
In pursuit of understanding the nature of peace, I have studied the construction and operation of international orders ever since I was a graduate student well over half a century ago. I am aware that the cultural, historic and strategic gaps in perception will pose formidable challenges for even the best-intentioned and most far-sighted leadership on both sides. On the other hand, were history confined to the mechanical repetition of the past, no transformation would ever have occurred. Every great achievement was a vision before it became a reality.
In his essay “Perpetual Peace,” the philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that perpetual peace would eventually come to the world in one of two ways: by human insight or by conflicts and catastrophes of a magnitude that left humanity no other choice. We are at such a juncture.
When Premier Zhou Enlai and I agreed on the communiqué that announced the secret visit, he said: “This will shake the world.” What a culmination if, 40 years later, the U.S. and China could merge their efforts not to shake the world, but to build it.
China vows to enhance cooperation with quake-hit Japan
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http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-05/12/c_13872167.htm
Li Yuanchao (R), head of the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, shakes hands with Hiromasa Yonekura, head of a visiting delegation of the Japan Business Federation, in Beijing, capital of China, May 12, 2011. Li Yuanchao met with the delegation on Thursday. (Xinhua/Huang Jingwen)
BEIJING, May 12 (Xinhua) — A senior official of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Thursday voiced willingness to promote exchanges and cooperation with Japan across all fields.
China is ready to make concerted efforts with Japan to cement a friendship between the people’s of the two countries and enrich a strategic relationship of mutual benefit, Li Yuanchao, head of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, told a delegation of the Japan Business Federation visiting Beijing.
“Economic and trade cooperation serves as an important pillar of Sino-Japanese relations,” Li said, hailing the active role played by the Japan Business Federation in promoting bilateral ties.
The federation groups most of Japan’s leading companies, industrial associations and regional economic organizations.
Noting that May 12 of this year marks the third anniversary of the devastating 2008 Wenchuan earthquake that left more than 80,000 Chinese people dead or missing, Li said China sympathizes with Japan’s suffering from the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that rocked the nation.
He also expressed hopes that young officials from the two countries continuously conduct exchange visits in the future.
Hiromasa Yonekura, the federation chairman and head of the delegation, said they are willing to make efforts to enhance bilateral friendship while pushing forward contact between the young generations of the two countries.
